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1 1. Introduction
2 Pressing socio-ecological problems, such as climate change, deforestation and chronic wildfire, 
3 present unique governance challenges (Padt et al. 2014; Jordan et al. 2015). They occur at 
4 multiple scales, affect diverse sectors, and have uncertain, controversial, and unevenly distributed 
5 impacts (e.g., Barlow et al, 2018; Marino and Ribot 2012; Ostrom 2010).
6
7 These challenges have elicited a broad range of interventions and, over the past two decades, 
8 many new governance arrangements have complemented, competed with, and occasionally 
9 transformed traditional government interventions (Jordan et al. 2005; Cashore et al. 2004; Doelle 
10 et al. 2012; Lambin et al. 2014; Obidzinski and Kusters 2015). Faced with this increasing 
11 governance “messiness”, there is an urgent need to document and analyse these interventions. 
12 Despite a wealth of case studies, there are few large-scale, structured descriptions and 
13 comparative analyses of the diverse interventions that respond to complex socio-ecological 
14 problems. Such contributions are prerequisite to identifying which types of interventions lead to 
15 improved environmental and social outcomes, asking for example whether factors like non-state 
16 involvement or “multi-level” decision-making (i.e. involving a variety of scales or sectors) improve 
17 outcomes (Koontz and Thomas 2006; Newig and Fritsch 2009; Huitema et al. 2009).
18
19 Scholars across contexts have explored variables that might shape intervention performance (see 
20 Table 1; IFRI 2018). This has included, for example, recognising the mismatch between traditional 
21 centralized, hierarchically-ordered approaches to rulemaking and program design, and the real-
22 world complexity of environmental problems (Ostrom 2010; Young 2002; McCarthy and Zen 2009; 
23 Termeer et al. 2010; Stewart et al. 2013). Scholars have highlighted the benefits of more diverse 
24 interventions that better reflect the complexity of socio-ecological problems (Young 2002; 
25 McCarthy and Zen 2009; Padt et al. 2014; Termeer et al. 2010; Stewart et al. 2013). Scholars 
26 have prescribed greater involvement of non-state actors, including arguments that private sector 
27 participation may improve intervention performance through market incentives and greater public 
28 participation (e.g., Anderson and Leal 1991, Forsyth 2010). Further, studies have highlighted that 
29 intervention outcomes can improve when diverse institutions with overlapping jurisdictions 
30 address a problem (e.g., Cash et al. 2006; Ostrom 2010). Importantly, scholars have identified the 
31 relevance of “targeting” to improve the performance of interventions: essentially, narrowing the 
32 parameters in which interventions apply in order to allocate resources to the specific stakeholders, 
33 sites, and times where they will be most impactful (see references in Table 1). For example, 
34 interventions from non-government or multilevel institutions are often more targeted, which can 
35 improve outcomes but may also introduce higher transaction costs and scaling challenges (e.g., 
36 Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren 1961; Wünscher et al. 2006; Wünscher et al. 2008; Sattler et al. 
37 2013). 
38
39 There is a need to make greater sense of the ensuing crowded intervention arenas — of 
40 interventions that engage different scales, sectors, and strategies. Such efforts should identify 
41 relevant interventions and systematically document their characteristics. This paper undertakes 
42 that work for Fire Management Interventions (FMI) to address chronic peat fires in Indonesia. 
43 Uncontrolled tropical fires are increasing in prevalence globally (Jolly et al.), including severe fires 
44 in the Brazilian Amazon and Indonesian peatlands at the time of writing. Peat fires in Indonesia 
45 are a complex socio-environmental problem that have motivated a large number of diverse fire 
46 management interventions (FMI) from government, industry, and civil society over the past three 
47 decades (Dennis 1999; Padfield et al. 2016; Tacconi, 2016). We describe “who is doing what” to 
48 address Indonesia’s peat fires, by (1) identifying and categorizing FMI, (2) grouping FMI according 
49 to their institutional characteristics, and (3) investigating how institutional types differed in terms of 
50 the design of the FMI they mandated. We anticipated that FMI would have low levels of targeting 
51 overall, specifically when it came to differentiating between types of landholders. We anticipated 
52 higher levels of targeting among some types of FMI, notably among those involving multi-level 
53 institutions and civil society. We also hypothesised that certain intervention strategies would be 
54 strongly associated with certain sectors, notably that the government interventions would primarily 
55 rely on regulatory strategies and industry on incentives. Where incentives were used, we 
56 anticipated that these would be limited to the private sector and that few would include elements 
57 of conditionality. 
58
59 “Stock-taking” of this intervention arena is timely, given the recent proliferation of new 
60 interventions as fires worsen. This study also contributes to the rapidly developing literatures on 
61 multi-level and polycentric governance by comparing interventions from diverse institutions 
62 responding to a single problem. It lays the groundwork for future studies assessing the 
63 comparative performance of different types of FMI, as it examines design variables suspected to 
64 affect performance (Table 1). Our comprehensive scope allows comparisons to be made across 
65 scales — geographic, political, and temporal — to an extent rare in the literature on the 
66 governance of complex socio-ecological problems (Newig and Fritsch 2009).
67
68 Peat fire in Indonesia
69 Extensive and increasingly frequent peat fires in Indonesia are causing severe carbon emissions, 
70 transboundary toxic smoke pollution (haze), ecosystem degradation, public health problems, 
71 economic losses, and diplomatic tensions in the ASEAN region (Yule 2008; Van der Werf 2015; 
72 Huijnen et al. 2016; Koplitz et al. 2016; Lohberger et al. 2017; Turetsky et al, 2014; Wijedasa et al. 
73 2017). Although numerous interventions have attempted to address them since the 1980s, these 
74 peat fires have evaded a simple or universal solution (Dennis et al. 2005; Carmenta et al. 2017).
75
76 Large-scale wildfires are historically rare in moist tropical environments including Indonesia’s peat 
77 swamp forests (Turetsky et al. 2014). Undisturbed peat is waterlogged and resistant to fire, but 
78 peatland which has been drained for plantation agriculture is highly flammable (Sloan et al, 2017).  
79 Historically, peatland has been widely regarded as unproductive marginal land in Indonesia 
80 (Persoon and Simarmata 2014), but advances in agricultural technology, rising international 
81 demand for commodities such as palm oil, and a lack of economic alternatives to cash crops have 
82 made peatland drainage and development profitable (McCarthy et al. 2012). Land use change on 
83 peatlands has created the conditions for large-scale conflagrations in Indonesia. Fires spread 
84 easily due to the high organic material content of peat soil, can smoulder for long periods at low 
85 intensities (making them difficult to detect using remote sensing), and can follow coal seams 
86 underground, creating conditions that challenge attempts to extinguish them (Whitehouse et al. 
87 2004; Turetsky et al. 2014). These fire events were previously associated with El Niño Southern 
88 Oscillation (ENSO) years but have recently begun to occur in non-ENSO years as well (Gaveau et 
89 al. 2014; Sloan et al. 2017). Peat fires contribute disproportionately to toxic haze and carbon 
90 emissions, as compared to fires on mineral soils, and affect an extensive land area and large 
91 numbers of people in the ASEAN region (Miettinen et al. 2012; Marlier et al. 2015). 
92
93 Traditionally, fire has been used in the agricultural practices of small-scale farmers in Indonesia, 
94 almost exclusively on mineral soils (Dove 1985). In contrast, today fire is used by new types of 
95 actors (e.g., immigrant farmers and absentee investors), at larger scales, and on new substrates 
96 with distinct ecological parameters — notably including peat soil (Chokkalingam et al. 2006; 
97 Cattau et al. 2016; Gaveau et al. 2017; Jelsma and Schoneveld 2016). Uncontrolled fire on 
98 peatland is exacerbated by failures of land use planning and law enforcement: fire is no longer 
99 used only for traditional agriculture but now may be used as retribution in land disputes, or where 
100 tenurial uncertainty removes incentives for careful management (Stolle et al. 2003; Dennis et al. 
101 2005; Varkkey 2013). Fire remains the cheapest and most accessible method of land clearance 
102 and preparation (Ding et al. 2016), and a blanket ban on its use is not likely to be effective, 
103 efficient, or equitable (Carmenta et al, 2018). In order for FMI to succeed, controls on ignition and 
104 substrate flammability must contend with the perceived benefits of peatland conversion (FAO 
105 2006
106
107 2. Methods 
108 2.1 Scope and inclusion criteria
109 We gathered data on the institutional characteristics and design of all FMI addressing peatland 
110 fires in Riau Province, Sumatra (Figure 1), begun between January of 1999 and December of 
111 2016 (n=60). We compiled our sample and dataset through a desk review of policy content, 
112 project documents, and sustainability reports, and then expanded and verified them through 
113 expert consultations in Jakarta and Pekanbaru with representatives from academia, civil society, 
114 government and industry (Supplementary Table A). We included international- and national-level 
115 FMI that apply in Riau, and those that were specific to Riau. Riau was selected because it is a site 
116 of dramatic land use change for oil palm and pulpwood cultivation (Miettinen et al. 2016), where 
117 frequent fires have prompted numerous FMI from diverse actors (Gaveau et al. 2014; 
118 Supplementary Table B).
119
120 Figure 1. Map of peatland extent in Riau, Sumatra. Source: Global Forest Watch derived from 




125 We included FMI with a stated intention to address peat fire, including those that addressed 
126 drivers (e.g., land tenure uncertainty) or undesirable outcomes (e.g., transboundary haze). We 
127 included FMI mandated by government, industry, and civil society, with geographic scales ranging 
128 from international to district-level. We included government regulations, decrees, and programs 
129 with provisions for enforcement and/or implementation (see section 2.2). We excluded enabling 
130 statutes (to avoid double-counting and counting unimplemented statutes), corporate sustainability 
131 pledges that were not clearly actioned, and advocacy campaigns. Our dataset contains no 
132 information on implementation or outcomes. 
133
134 2.2 Characterising FMI design
135 To characterise FMI design, we assessed the literature to identify variables that were salient to 
136 the performance of FMI and of interventions addressing complex socio-ecological problems more 
137 broadly (Table 1). Through an iterative process, we refined our selection of variables to those that 
138 were also present in our dataset. We identified six variables for which information was available in 
139 the documentation of all 60 FMI: four describing FMI design (see Table 1) and two describing the 
140 institutional characteristics of FMI (Table 2).
141
142 2.2.1. Intervention design
143 We characterized each FMI according to its design (Table 1). The first design variable 
144 characterised FMI strategy according to four broad types: regulation and enforcement, incentives, 
145 technical solutions, and reform (adapted from Carmenta et al. 2017). Among FMI that used 
146 incentives, we also recorded whether the incentives were conditional; whether conditional 
147 incentives were triggered by inputs or results (e.g., fire occurrence or haze levels), and whether 
148 they involved “new” economic policy instruments such as eco-labelling (see Jordan et al. 2005). 
149 The second design variable captured the overall approach to fire mitigation by identifying whether 
150 FMI focused on preventing fires or responding to them (i.e. via fire-fighting) (or both). Thirdly, we  
151 identified the primary geographic scale of FMI implementation.
152
153 Finally, the fourth design variable recorded the degree to which FMI were designed to target high-
154 risk soil types (i.e., peat soil), differentiate between types of landholders that have different 
155 relationships to fire; and target time periods of particularly high fire risk (e.g., ENSO years, dry 
156 seasons, midday). Research on the causes of fires and analyses of FMI performance have 
157 consistently emphasized that narrowing FMI applicability to these areas, actors and time periods 
158 would improve their effectiveness, efficiency, and equity (see Table 1). 
159
160 Table 1: FMI intervention design variables 
Variable Description Values Explanation and justification 
Regulation:




yes, no Regulation-based interventions included 
legislation, but also non-state interventions 
that support enforcement through watchdog 
activities (e.g., the NGO Jikalahari)
Incentives: 
Does the FMI 
use 
incentives?
yes, no This includes all FMI that attempt to change 
behavior through the distribution of 
conditional and unconditional benefits, either 
in cash or in kind.
Incentives are often identified as a 
mechanism driving improved performance 
among private environmental interventions 
(e.g., McCarthy and Zen 2009; Dryzek 1997; 
Humphreys 2008).









Conditional refers to the release of incentives 
based on meeting a predefined requirement, 
condition for the reward. Conditional cash 
transfers are expected to be related to 

















“Trigger” refers to the conditions that must be 
met before conditional incentives are 
disbursed. “Input-based” triggers require 
conditions to be met that are indirectly related 
to the desired result. “Results-based” triggers 
disburse incentives when a desired result is 
achieved (Sattler et al. 2013).
Are eco-




yes, no Eco-labels seek to promote sustainable 
behaviours by providing consumers with 
information about the social and 
environmental impacts of their purchases. 
They are one of the “‘new’ economic policy 
instruments” (NEPI) becoming increasingly 
popular in environmental governance 
(Cashore et al. 2004; Jordan et al. 2005).
Reform: Does 





yes, no This includes FMI making changes in 
jurisdiction, administration, and resourcing 
directly intended to improve fire management 
(e.g., the 2007 version of the RSPO 
establishing a complaint process, or 
Presidential Instruction 11/2015 restructuring 
the Regional Disaster Management Agency 
with the goal of better responding to fires) 
Technical 
solutions: 
Does the FMI 
use technical 
solutions?
yes, no Examples of technical solutions to peat fires 
include fire fighting and peatland rewetting
Approach to 
fire mitigation
Does the FMI 
attempt to 
prevent fires, 






Studies of FMI frequently distinguish 
preventative from reactive measures (e.g., 
Vayda 2010; Nurhidayah 2014). 
Diverse stakeholders agree that preventative 
instruments should be prioritized on peat soil 













This variable refers to the geographic scale 






Does the FMI 
treat peat soil 
distinctly from 
mineral soil?
yes, no Peat soil...
● is more flammable when drained than 
mineral soil (Turetsky et al. 2014);
● undergoes combustion that is uniquely 
difficult to extinguish (Turetsky et al. 
2014; Whitehouse et al. 2004);
● has been the main source of toxic 
smoke pollution and carbon emissions 
from wildfires in Indonesia (Koplitz et 
al, 2016; Sargeant 2001; Marlier et al. 
2015); and
● is less frequently used for small-scale 
or traditional agriculture than mineral 












1, 2, 3 Landholder type (e.g., plot size, land title, 
residence type) is linked to...
● land use dynamics and land clearance 
behaviors (Ekadinata et al. 2013; 
Jelsma and Schoneveld 2016);
● landholder capacity and motivation to 
manage fire safely (Bompard and 
Guizol 1999; Stolle et al. 2003; Dennis 
et al. 2005; Hidayat et al. 2015; 
Jelsma et al. 2017); and
● expressed preferences for effective 
FMI (Carmenta et al, 2017).
Failure of FMI to differentiate among actors... 
● disproportionately negatively affects 
smaller farmers (Tan 2005);
● can create scope for rent-seeking 
(Mathews 2005);
● impedes efforts to prosecute serious 
offenders (Mayer 2006);
● limits scalability of interventions 
(Jelsma et al. 2017);
● can unnecessarily illegalize and 
disarticulate landholders (Mathews 
2005; Jelsma and Schoneveld 2016); 
and













yes, no Risk of wildfire varies with weather conditions, 
time of year, time of day, and cyclical climatic 
phenomena like ENSO (Gaveau et al. 2014; 
Marlier et al. 2015; Taufik et al, 2018).
Targeting high-risk time periods is part of fire 
management strategies worldwide, from 
national schemes (e.g. Monzón-Alvarado et 
al. 2014) to community fire-based agriculture 
practices (e.g. Carmenta et al. 2013).
161
162
163 2.2.2 Institutional characteristics
164 We used two variables to characterize the institutions behind FMI. Firstly, we classified the lead 
165 (i.e., mandating) institution(s) of each FMI as either government, industry, or civil society (Table 
166 2). Secondly, we recorded whether FMI decision-making structures were multi-level or 
167 monocentric. FMI were coded as multi-level if decision-making structures involved multiple 
168 jurisdictional levels (i.e., district, provincial, national, international), multiple functional sectors (i.e. 
169 agriculture, forestry, environment, public works), or multiple societal sectors (i.e. government, 
170 industry, civil society). Most FMI coded as multi-level had several of these characteristics. 
171 Although somewhat crude, this measure was most practical for our purposes, as there is no 
172 agreed-upon framework for evaluating governance properties such as polycentricity, adaptivity 
173 and multilevel character (Hooghe and Marks 2003; Huitema et al. 2009).
174
175 Table 2. FMI lead institution and decision-making structure in Riau, Indonesia (full membership 
176 list in Supplementary Table B) 





Civil society 5 4
* Involving multiple jurisdictional levels, functional sectors or societal sectors 
177
178
179 2.3 Method of analysis 
180 We used descriptive statistics to present the diversity of FMI, and non-parametric statistical tests 
181 to analyze relationships among variables describing FMI design (Table 1) and FMI institutional 
182 characteristics (Table 2). Nonparametric tests were most suitable due to the relatively small size 
183 of the dataset and the uneven distribution of observations among the variables. We used Fisher’s 
184 exact test to evaluate the relatedness of categorical variables (e.g. the relatedness of our 
185 targeting variables with sector), and examined adjusted residuals using the Bonferroni correction 
186 to determine which categories were significantly related to sector. Finally, we used Kruskal-Wallis 
187 H tests for relationships between variables describing FMI institutional characteristics and FMI 
188 design, and the geographic scale at which FMI were intended to apply. All statistical analyses 
189 were conducted in SPSS 22.0. 
190
191 3. Results 
192 3.1 Design of Fire Management Interventions 
193 We identified a total of 60 FMI which addressed fire in Riau Province. FMI strategies were 
194 diverse, as captured by our four broad strategic categories (Figure 2; Table 3). They were 
195 dominated by regulation and enforcement-based strategies (68%), almost all of which sought to 
196 restrict and deter fire use. Technical solutions were the second most common strategy (55%), 
197 followed by incentive-based strategies (38%) and reform (35%). Importantly, most FMI employed 
198 a mix of strategies (58%, Figure 2). Almost all FMI (92%) included some aspect of fire prevention 
199 (e.g., canal blocking to reflood peatlands). Many (70%) took a responsive approach to fire 
200 mitigation (e.g., fire fighting), and the majority of FMI included measures to both prevent and fight 
201 fires (62%).
202
203 Of incentive-based FMI, a larger number than expected (50%) employed elements of 
204 conditionality. However, the majority disbursed benefits based on the completion of an “input” 
205 action expected to reduce fire occurrence, such as the use of prescribed fire-free land-clearing 
206 methods (67%). The remaining 42% of FMI using conditional incentives disbursed benefits based 
207 on the occurrence of a desired environmental result, such as haze severity falling below a 
208 specified threshold or a year passing without fire events (21% of incentive-based FMI). A small 
209 number of FMI used “new economic policy instruments”, primarily eco-labelling schemes. 
210
211 Nearly half of FMI were government-led interventions, although the dataset contained FMI from 
212 relatively diverse sectors, including a recent wave of industry-led FMI (77% of industry-led FMI 
213 appeared since 2013) (Table 3; Supplementary Table B). Nearly half of FMI (43%) were 
214 characterized as “multi-level”. There was no significant relationship between multi-level decision 
215 making and sector.
216
217 Over half of FMI (63%) distinguished between interventions on peat versus mineral soils, and 
218 around one third of FMI focused exclusively on peat soils (33%). Most FMI (>90%) treated 
219 landholders differently based on whether they were “smallholders” or “businesses”, but did not 
220 distinguish additional categories, and inconsistently specified the definitions used to classify 
221 landholder types. Only 12% of FMI targeted high-risk time periods.
222
223 Figure 2. Fire Management Interventions (FMI) in Riau Province, Sumatra (1999-2016; n=60), 
224 presented by type of FMI strategy and lead sector (definitions in Table 1).
225
1. Indonesia-Malaysia Collaboration in Rokan Hilir
2. Integrated Forestry and Farming System Project
3. Minamas/Sime Darby fire response program
4. UNDP canal blocking
5. Indofire System
6. Southeast Asia Fire Danger Rating System
7. Perkumpulan Elang canal blocking and peat re-wetting
8. Seruni gender-based community empowerment
9. Eyes on the Forest hotspot monitoring and investigation
10. PM.Haze peatland restoration
11. Wetlands International peatland mapping
12. Greenpeace research and investigation
13. World Resources Institute research and investigation
14. Mitra Insani Foundation canal blocking
15. ASEAN ATHP Guidelines 2004
16. ASEAN ATHP Guidelines 2003
17. Government Regulation 71/2014
18. Ministry of Agriculture Regulation 
11/Permentan/OT.140/3/2015
19. Ministry of Agriculture Regulation 
14/Permentan/PL.110/2/2009
20. Ministry of Agriculture Regulation 
26/Permentan/OT.140/2/2007
21. Ministry of Agriculture Regulation 98/2013
22. Ministry of Environment Instruction S.494MENLHK-
PHPL2015
23. Ministry of Environment Regulation 7/2014
24. Riau Provincial Regulation 8/2014
25. APRIL Group Fire Free Village program
26. Asian Agri Fire Free Village program
27. Asosiasi Amanah
31. Riau Ecosystem Restoration Project
32. Indonesian National Board for Disaster 
Management Rapid Response Brigade
33. ASEAN Panel of Experts
34. Ministry of Forestry Regulation P.12/Menhut-
II/2009
35. SEApeat project
36. ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze 
Pollution
37. Perdes 7/2009 Sepahat/Bengkalis
38. Jikalahari hotspot monitoring, watchdog activities
39. Government Regulation 57/2016
40. Government Regulation 45/2004
41. Presidential Instruction 10/2011
42. Presidential Instruction 6/2013
43. Presidential Instruction 8/2015
44. ASEAN Peatland Forests Project
45. Fire Care Communities
46. Ministry of Agriculture Regulation 
47/Permentan/OT.140/4/2014
47. Presidential Instruction 1/2016
48. Presidential Instruction 16/2011
49. Riau Governor Regulation 5/2015
50. Indonesian Palm Oil Pledge
51. Directorate General of Forest Protection and 
Nature Conservation 21/KTPS/DJ-IV/2002
52. Presidential Instruction 11/2015
53. RSPO 2005
54. RSPO principles and criteria 2007
55. Government Regulation 4/2001
56. Governor Regulation 11/2014 
28. FSC deforestation monitoring
29. Musim Mas Fire Free Village program
30. Giam Siak Kecil Bukit Batu Biosphere Reserve
57. Minister of Agriculture 
19/Permentan/OT.140/3/2011
58. Ministry of Environment Regulation 10/2010
59. REDD+ Management Agency auditing program
60. RSPO principles and criteria 2013
226
227 3.2 Differences in FMI design across institutional types
228 As we anticipated, design differed significantly between FMI from government, industry, and civil 
229 society. For example, different sectors employed distinct types of intervention strategies: sector 
230 was significantly associated with use of regulation and enforcement, incentives, technical 
231 solutions, and reform (p = 0.000, 0.000, 0.001, and 0.026, respectively, ɑ=0.05). Specifically, as 
232 expected, government-led FMI were associated with the use of regulatory or enforcement-based 
233 strategies (p=0.004, ɑ=0.008), and civil society-led FMI with their absence (p= 0.000, ɑ=0.008). 
234 As predicted, industry-led FMI were associated with the use of incentives (p= 0.000, ɑ=0.008), 
235 while civil society-led FMI were associated with technical interventions (p= 0.004, ɑ=0.008) 
236 (Figure 2). There were no significant relationships between FMI design and whether FMI decision 
237 making was multi-level. 
238
239 Among FMI that used incentives, the use of conditionality was significantly associated with sector 
240 (p= 0.000, ɑ=0.05). Specifically, government-led FMI were associated with the use of 
241 unconditional incentives (p=0.002, ɑ=0.008), and industry-led FMI with the use of conditional 
242 incentives (p=0.000, ɑ=0.008). 
243
244 The use of eco-label schemes to verify sustainable practices was also significantly associated 
245 with sector (p=0.000, ɑ=0.05). Specifically, their use was associated with industry-led FMI 
246 (p=0.000, ɑ=0.008), and they were absent from government-led FMI (p=0.002, ɑ=0.008). The 
247 relationships between FMI sector and FMI design variables are summarized in Table 3.
248
249 The use of targeting by FMI was low overall, as hypothesized, and largely did not vary 
250 significantly across institutional types. Targeting to peat soils and high-risk time periods were not 
251 significantly related to sector. The exception was targeting among landholders, which was 
252 significantly associated with sector (p=0.002, ɑ=0.05). Specifically, government-led FMI tended to 
253 treat landholders as a uniform group (54%), or distinguish only between “smallholders” and 
254 “businesses” (42%) (p=0.001, ɑ=0.005). In contrast, industry-led FMI always targeted 
255 smallholders and businesses separately (p=0.003, ɑ=0.005). FMI that used eco-labelling were the 
256 most nuanced, with distinct rules and programs for “businesses”, “independent smallholders”, and 
257 “schemed smallholders” (i.e. smallholders operating within a cooperative system within large 
258 agricultural concessions (Jelsma and Schoneveld 2017). 
259
260 There were significant relationships between sector and the geographic scale on which FMI were 
261 designed to operate (p=0.00): notably, FMI led by civil society were exclusively district-level 
262 (Table 3). Incentive-based intervention strategies were also significantly associated with 
263 geographic scale (p = 0.00). Specifically, the use of incentives was associated with smaller 
264 geographic scales, with 54% of incentive-based FMI operating at the district level, and incentives 
265 triggered by results operating exclusively at the district level. That said, eco-labelling schemes 
266 were notably designed to operate on an international scale. There were no significant 
267 relationships between geographic scale and FMI targeting by soil type, landholder type or time 
268 period.
269
270 Table 3. Relationships between FMI design and lead sector (Percent by sector; asterisks indicate 










Type of intervention strategy*♰
Regulation and enforcement 31(82) 9(69) 1(11) 41(68)
Technical solutions 21(55) 3(23) 9(100) 33 (55)
Reform 17(45) 4(31) 0 21(35)
Incentives 12(32) 12(92) 0 24(40)
Use of conditionality* 3(8) 9(69) 0 12(20)
Results-based 2(5) 3(13) - 5(8)
Input-based 2(5) 6(46) - 8(13)
Use of eco-labels* 0 5(39) 0 5(8)
Geographic scale*
District 6(16) 8(62) 9(100) 23(38)
Provincial 4(11) 0 0 4(7)
National 23(62) 0 0 23(38)
International 5(13) 5(39) 0 10(17)
Approach♰
Fire prevention 34(89) 13(100) 8(89) 55(92)
Fire response 31(82) 7(54) 4(44) 42(70)
Targeting
Target peat soils 23 (61) 8(62) 7(78) 38(63)
Differentiate ≥2 landholder 
groups*
12(32) 12(92) 3(33) 27(45)




276 4.1 FMI employed diverse types of intervention strategies 
277 While FMI employed strikingly diverse intervention strategies (Figure 2), a large proportion 
278 nonetheless focused on regulation and enforcement. Many of these FMI overlapped in scope, or 
279 even conflicted with other regulations (e.g., Ardiansyah et al. 2015), perhaps reflecting a 
280 “disjointed incrementalism” in the government’s response to fire (see Lindblom 1979). There is 
281 evidence from both the media and the scientific literature that environmental regulations in 
282 Indonesia have historically underperformed, due to low state capacity and political accountability 
283 (e.g., McCarthy and Zen 2009; Tacconi 2016; Varkkey 2013; Nesadurai 2018). Given this 
284 evidence, our finding that regulation was a common government response to peat fire, but largely 
285 lacked appropriate targeting among landholders, suggests that many FMI are likely to face 
286 implementation challenges (e.g., Thung et al. 2019). 
287
288 Interventions involving institutional reform were less common among FMI, despite the important 
289 role that institutional dysfunction has played in the peat fire problem (see Purnomo et al. 2017). 
290 For example, government agencies budgets are often tied to traditional firefighting FMI that no 
291 longer reflects best practices (Miettinen et al. 2016). This result indicates a key area in which FMI 
292 design can be improved, as does our finding that conditionality of incentives is lacking. 
293
294 In contrast, while commentators on Indonesia’s peat fires have long criticized a perceived lack of 
295 emphasis on fire prevention (e.g., CIFOR 2015; Purnomo et al. 2017), we found that most FMI 
296 adopted preventative approaches. These preventative FMI addressed the drivers of fire through 
297 attempts such as changing burning behavior and reducing land flammability through peatland 
298 reflooding (see Supplementary Table B). It is possible that this observed neglect has been 
299 rectified in recent years, or that fire prevention has been neglected during FMI implementation 
300 rather than in FMI design. Importantly, this shows an existing policy base from which to work.
301
302 4.2 Intervention design differs among government, industry and civil society 
303 Government, industry and civil society took different approaches to FMI design. They differed 
304 significantly in terms of the types of intervention strategies they used, notably the use of 
305 incentives, and the forms of targeting they employed (Table 3). Despite these tendencies, FMI 
306 from all sectors tended to employ multiple intervention strategies and mixes were more common 
307 than single strategy approaches (Figure 2). Contrary to our expectations, our findings indicated no 
308 significant design differences between multi-level and monocentric FMI (Table 3).
309
310 The results show that government FMI continued to be primarily based on regulation and 
311 enforcement (82%), but were also engaged in incentive-based strategies (32%). This reflects the 
312 increasing use of market-based tools in environmental policy by governments over the past three 
313 decades (Stavins 2003; Jordan et al. 2005; McCarthy and Zen 2009). Similarly, recent work has 
314 highlighted that many contemporary market-based environmental initiatives rely on government 
315 support and coordination (Vatn 2015). Incentives were, nevertheless, strongly associated with 
316 industry FMI, many of which have appeared in the past decade (69% initiated since 2012). 
317 Further, where incentives were used, industry FMI were associated with the conditional 
318 disbursement of incentives, while government-led incentive schemes tended to be unconditional. 
319 This difference is particularly interesting given recent criticisms of incentive schemes that lack 
320 conditionality (e.g., Birdsall et al. 2011) and the rarity of conditional disbursement in their design 
321 (Wunder et al. 2018). 
322
323 Another notable design difference among sectors involved the use of landholder targeting. 
324 Industry FMI employed significantly more nuanced landholder targeting than other sectors, 
325 frequently employing basic distinctions in landholders size, and occasionally distinguishing 
326 “independent” from “schemed” landholders. Once again, government FMI represented the 
327 opposite extreme, often treating landholders uniformly, irrespective of basic distinctions in size, 
328 types of ownership and degree of absenteeism. This finding is likely due to the fact that many 
329 industry FMI operate at the district scale allowing greater local nuance, and were led by 
330 companies with potentially strong incentives to establish fire mitigation measures with their 
331 neighbours. Indeed, industry FMI focused primarily on changing the behaviors of smallholder 
332 farmers. 
333
334 These differences provide a starting point for analysing and comparing FMI performance across 
335 sectors and different design configurations (Table 1). There is also scope to test whether, as 
336 suggested in the literature, the design variables identified in Table 1 are determinants of particular 
337 social and environmental outcomes. 
338
339 Moreover, our data suggests the need to further explore interactions among FMI from different 
340 sectors. For example, certain government interventions (some of which are too recent to feature 
341 in our dataset) have scaled up or adapted FMI designs pioneered by industry. This includes the 
342 Government of Indonesia’s mandatory Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO) standard, which is 
343 a clear adaptation of the industry-led Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) standard’s 
344 eco-label model (Hospes 2014). The Government of Indonesia also reportedly plans to implement 
345 the “fire free village” model developed by industry in over 700 villages across the country (Sloan 
346 et al. 2017). The “fire free village” and eco-label models were notable in our dataset for their high 
347 levels of targeting and use of conditional incentives, although both operate at limited scales. 
348 Studies of polycentric and multi-level governance systems have identified a trade-off between the 
349 nuance and policy fit that can be achieved by “messy” governance systems and the scaling and 
350 coordination that monocentric government offers (Ostrom et al. 1961). Case studies of municipal 
351 service provision, irrigation systems, and international climate governance suggest that, while 
352 multilevel and non-state interventions are often more creative, state involvement may be required 
353 for coordination at larger spatial scales (Ostrom et al. 1961; Huitema et al. 2009; Meinzen-Dick 
354 1997; Meinzen-Dick 2007; Bernstein and Hoffman 2018). Whether this type of policy learning is 
355 occurring in the case of Indonesia’s peat fires will determine the implications of our findings. In 
356 addition, since industry FMI have tended to focus on changing smallholder behavior (with notable 
357 exceptions such as the short-lived Indonesian Palm Oil Pledge (IPOP)), scholars should monitor 
358 whether government adoption of industry intervention models serves to perpetuate blame 
359 narratives that overemphasize the culpability of smallholders (e.g., Forsyth 2014). Similarly, 
360 scholars should monitor whether complementary interventions that capture additional land users 
361 (e.g., medium sized enterprises) are enacted. 
362
363 4.3 Fire Management Interventions were largely untargeted
364
365 As FMI promulgate rapidly, supported by development and private funds deployed after the 
366 disastrous 2015 fires, there is a need to evaluate the extent to which FMI have incorporated 
367 existing design recommendations. In particular, despite the importance of targeting to shaping 
368 outcomes (Table 1), our results showed that targeting high-risk soil types, actors and time periods 
369 was rare among the interventions in our dataset.
370
371 The most common type of targeting was based on soil type, and most FMI (63%) targeted peat 
372 soil as distinct from mineral soil. This is important because of peat soil’s specific implications for 
373 fire, haze and greenhouse gas emissions, and because of the unique biophysical challenges to 
374 fire prevention and fire fighting on peat soil (Hameiri and Jones 2017; Turetsky et al. 2014). 
375 Several prominent FMI failed to target peat soil, including the 2015 national ban on all fire use, 
376 regardless of soil type. This has limited the land use options of small-scale traditional farmers 
377 operating on mineral soil with comparatively low risk of fire escape (Thung et al, 2019; Jelmsa et 
378 al. 2017).
379
380 Among FMI that targeted landholders, few distinguished among landholder types (45% 
381 differentiated 2 or more landholder types). When they did, distinctions were almost always limited 
382 to a coarse distinction between “smallholders” and “businesses”. There is considerable scope to 
383 make this landholder targeting more reflective of land use management on-the-ground; there are 
384 at least seven distinct smallholder categories within Riau, ranging from small-scale farmers 
385 without tenure to wealthy absentee investors to medium-sized enterprises (Jelsma et al. 2017). 
386 Even FMI with the most nuanced approaches to landholder targeting did not differentiate 
387 landholders by the size of their landholding (beyond the distinction between “smallholders” and 
388 “businesses”) or degree of absenteeism. Yet these different types of landholders have distinct 
389 motivations for using fire, different levels of access to alternative land-clearing techniques, and 
390 different levels of capacity to manage and fight fires (Dennis et al. 2005, Jelsma and Schoneveld 
391 2016; Jelsma et al. 2017). Moreover, they have distinct and often conflicting perspectives on the 
392 benefits of using fire, the burdens that result from escaped peatland fires, and the effectiveness of 
393 different solutions (Carmenta et al. 2017). Failure to account for these distinctions is likely to 
394 undermine FMI performance. 
395
396 Finally, FMI rarely (20%) targeted the high-risk time periods most associated with escaped fire 
397 such as dry seasons, ENSO years, or hot or windy times of day. Yet, this temporal targeting is 
398 used around the world to reduce the likelihood of wildfires while enabling low-risk forms of fire 
399 use, including in Malaysia, Brazil, and Australia (Wong et al. 2010; Monzón-Alvarado et al. 2014; 
400 Taufik et al. 2018). Temporal targeting can also improve the equity outcomes of FMI by limiting 
401 restrictions on fire use among small-scale farmers who lack access to other land clearing options 
402 (Kull 2004; Carmenta et al. 2018).
403
404 Despite the ban on fire use in land management, there is some qualitative evidence that FMI 
405 targeting has tended to improve over time.  For example, in 2009, the industry-led RSPO standard 
406 began to distinguish independent smallholders from schemed smallholders; the government-led 
407 ISPO standard followed suit in 2015. In 2016, the Government of Indonesia established the 
408 Peatland Restoration Agency which focuses on peatland restoration as part of its fire 
409 management efforts. The ASEAN “zero burn” guidelines for land clearing, which are often 
410 referenced by other FMI, introduced new guidelines in 2004 to allow for the managed use of fire 
411 by specific actors in specific geographic areas and time periods (ASEAN 2004). 
412
413 5. Conclusion 
414 As environmental governance arenas become increasingly diverse and “messy”, there is an 
415 urgent need to describe and compare interventions. Mapping out the landscape (e.g., Figure 2) 
416 allows practitioners to think about "where" their interventions fall in relation to others, including 
417 others in their sector. Indeed, while anyone working on Indonesia’s peat fire challenge will be 
418 familiar with some of these interventions, the diversity of FMI highlighted in this study is rarely 
419 acknowledged. Descriptive work can support policy learning by helping practitioners and 
420 emerging FMI consider possible gaps in their intervention design. For example, we highlight gaps 
421 associated with the targeting of different stakeholder types and fire risk periods, and the use of 
422 conditionality within incentive schemes—design attributes highlighted in the literature as relevant 
423 to performance. 
424
425 Drawing on our documentary work, we demonstrate a method for looking at the relationships 
426 between institutional characteristics, intervention design, and--ultimately--social and 
427 environmental outcomes. This paper contributes by characterizing the institutional characteristics 
428 of fire management interventions in Indonesia, and identifying differences in design between 
429 institutional types that the literature suggests are relevant to outcomes. Future research should 
430 examine whether the differences we observed translate into differences in outcomes, and under 
431 what conditions. In particular, there is scope to explore how different strategies and levels of 
432 targeting perform, especially when it comes to the challenge of balancing nuanced intervention 
433 design with scalability. 
434
435 More research is also needed on the patterns of interaction between FMI, and between 
436 interventions responding to other complex socio-ecological problems. Weighting interventions by 
437 factors such as market footprint, legal force and political power would allow future research to 
438 better examine how diverse interventions fit together as a governance system (Morrison 2017). 
439 Given the diversity of FMI documented in this paper, future research should evaluate whether 
440 Indonesia’s peat fire governance system exhibits polycentric characteristics such as policy 
441 learning and mutual adjustment (McGinnis 2016). 
442
443 Our results underscore the importance of developing and monitoring comprehensive databases of 
444 governance activities addressing complex socio-ecological problems (e.g., Jerrells and Ostrom 
445 1995; IFRI 2018; Simonet et al. 2018; LFPFN 2018). This study’s categorizations can inform the 
446 future development of such datasets, with the ultimate goal of identifying relationships between 
447 institutional characteristics, intervention design, and outcomes. By constructing a more complete 
448 understanding of environmental governance initiatives addressing tropical peat fires and other 
449 complex environmental challenges, we can work towards a better understanding of how best to 
450 govern them in the future. 
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APRIL Group February 3, 2017
Institut Pertanian Bogor, World Bank, and 
REDD+ Task Force
February 14, 2017
Jikalahari May 2, 2017
463
464 Supplementary Table B: Fire Management Interventions and their institutional groupings
Lead actor / 
decision-making 
Monocentric Multilevel
Government Directorate General of Forest 
Protection and Nature 
Conservation 21/KTPS/DJ-IV/2002 
on guidelines for the establishment 
of forest fire control brigades
Ministry of Agriculture Regulation 
no. 14/Permentan/PL.110/2/2009 
on guidelines for the utilisation of 
peatland areas for oil palm 
cultivation
Government Regulation 71/2014 
on the protection and management 
of peatland
United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP): canal blocking in 
peatlands (2015)
Ministry of Environment Instruction 
S.494MENLHK-PHPL2015 
prohibiting peatland development
Ministry of Environment Regulation 
10/2010 on the mechanisms of 
environmental pollution and 
damage prevention related to forest 
and land fires 
Governor Regulation 11/2014 on 
the Forest and Land Fire Control 
Center of Riau Province
Indonesia-Malaysia Collaboration in 
Rokan Hilir under the ASEAN 
Peatland Management Project: air 
quality monitoring and education in 
zero-burn farming techniques (2008)
Fire Care Communities based on 
Regulation of The General Director 
Forest Protection and Natural 
Conservation No.P. 2IV-SET2014 
REDD+ Management Agency: 
auditing compliance of agroforestry 
corporations with fire and peat 
management rules (2014)
Ministry of Forestry Regulation 
P.12/Menhut-II/2009 on forest fire 
control 
Presidential Instruction 16/2011 on 
the improvement of Land and Forest 
Fire Control 
ASEAN Agreement on 
Transboundary Haze Pollution 
(2002)
ASEAN Peatland Forests Project: 
institutional change, conserving 
peatlands, and encouraging 
sustainable management (2009)
Indonesian National Board for 
Disaster Management Rapid 
Response Brigade (2009)
Government of Indonesia 
Regulation 4/2001 on 
environmental damage and 
pollution control in relation to forest 
and land fires
Government of Indonesia 
Regulation 45/2004 on forest 
protection
Ministry of Agriculture Regulation 
no. 26/Permentan/OT.140/2/2007 
on the guidelines for estate crop 
licensing
Presidential Instruction 10/2011 
establishing a moratorium on 
developing peatlands
Presidential Instruction 6/2013 
establishing a moratorium on 
developing peatlands
Ministry of Agriculture Regulation 
no. 47/Permentan/OT.140/4/2014 
on the establishment of fire brigade 
and the guidelines for the 
prevention and control of forest and 
land fires
Ministry of Environment Regulation 
7/2014 on environmental loss due 
to pollution and environmental 
damages
Presidential Instruction 11/2015 on 
the improvement of forest and land 
fire control
Presidential Instruction 8/2015 
establishing a moratorium on 
developing peatlands
Ministry of Agriculture Regulation 
no. 11/Permentan/OT.140/3/2015 
ASEAN Panel of Experts on Fire and 
Haze Assessment and Coordination 
(2005)
SEApeat project: institutional 
change, fire monitoring, and 
incentives and education for 
sustainable peatland management 
(2011)
Southeast Asia Fire Danger Rating 
System project (1999)
Indofire System under the Indonesia-
Australia Forest Carbon Partnership: 
hotspot monitoring (2009)
Perdes 7/2009 Sepahat/Bengkalis 
ASEAN Agreement on 
Transboundary Haze Pollution: 
Guidelines for the Implementation of 
the ASEAN Policy on Zero Burning 
(2003)
ASEAN Agreement on 
Transboundary Haze Pollution: 
Guidelines for the Implementation of 
Controlled Burning Practices (2004)
on Indonesian Sustainable Palm 
Oil (ISPO) 
Presidential Instruction 1/2016 on 
Peat Restoration Agency
Riau Provincial Regulation 8/2014 
on Environmental Management 
and Environmental Law 
Compliance Riau Province
Ministry of Agriculture Regulation 
No. 98 of 2013
Minister of Agriculture 
No.19/Permentan/OT.140/3/2011 
creating the Indonesian 
Sustainable Palm Oil certification  
Government Regulation No. 
57/2016 
Riau Governor Regulation No. 
5/2015 
Industry Riau Ecosystem Restoration 
Project (APRIL Group in 
partnership with Flora and Fauna 
International and Bidara): support 
and incentives for community-
based conservation on the Kampar 
Peninsula (2013)
Integrated Forestry and Farming 
System Project (Asia Pulp and 
Paper in partnership with Desa 
Makmur Peduli Api) (2016): support 
and incentives for community-
based forest conservation
APRIL Group Fire Free Village 
program: fire management 
incentives and education for 
communities (2014) 
Asian Agri Fire Free Village 
program: fire management 
incentives and education for 
communities (2016)
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 
(RSPO): principles and criteria 
(2013) 
Asosiasi Amanah: oil palm 
smallholders collective providing 
support for RSPO and ISPO 
certification (2011)
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC): 
deforestation monitoring (2014) 
Indonesian Palm Oil Pledge (IPOP): 
evaluation and audit licensing of peat 
(2015)
Giam Siak Kecil Bukit Batu 
Biosphere Reserve (Sinar Mas in 
partnership with civil society and 
government) (2009)
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 
(RSPO): principles and criteria 
(2007)
Musim Mas Fire Free Village 
program: fire management 
incentives and education for 
communities (2016)
Minamas/Sime Darby: fire 
response and monitoring and fire 
management education for 
communities (2015) 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 
(RSPO) (2005)
Civil society Wetlands International: peatland 
mapping in consultation with 
Deltares (2015) 
Greenpeace: research and 
investigation (2013)
Indonesian Women's Union 
(Seruni): gender-based community 
empowerment (2015)
Riau Forest Rescue Network 
(Jikalahari): hotspot monitoring and 
watchdog activities (2016)
Mitra Insani Foundation: canal 
blocking (2012)
World Resources Institute: research 
and investigation (2014)
Eyes on the Forest: hotspot 
monitoring and investigation (2015)
Perkumpulan Elang in partnership 
with the Riau Natural Resources 
Conservation Centre: canal blocking 
and peat re-wetting (2016)
People's Movement to Stop Haze 
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Supplementary Table A: List of experts consulted
Institution Interview date
World Resource Institute Indonesia February 1, 2017
APRIL Group February 3, 2017
Institut Pertanian Bogor, World Bank, and REDD+ Task Force February 14, 2017
Jikalahari May 2, 2017
Supplementary Table B: Fire management interventions and their institutional 
characteristics




Government Directorate General of Forest Protection and 
Nature Conservation 21/KTPS/DJ-IV/2002 on 
guidelines for the establishment of forest fire 
control brigades
Ministry of Agriculture Regulation no. 
14/Permentan/PL.110/2/2009 on guidelines 
for the utilisation of peatland areas for oil 
palm cultivation
Government Regulation 71/2014 on the 
protection and management of peatland
United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP): canal blocking in peatlands (2015)
Ministry of Environment Instruction 
S.494MENLHK-PHPL2015 prohibiting 
peatland development
Ministry of Environment Regulation 10/2010 
on the mechanisms of environmental 
pollution and damage prevention related to 
forest and land fires 
Governor Regulation 11/2014 on the Forest 
and Land Fire Control Center of Riau 
Province
Indonesian National Board for Disaster 
Management Rapid Response Brigade 
(2009)
Indonesia-Malaysia 
Collaboration in Rokan Hilir 
under the ASEAN Peatland 
Management Project: air 
quality monitoring and 
education in zero-burn 
farming techniques (2008)
Fire Care Communities 
based on Regulation of The 
General Director Forest 




Agency: auditing compliance 
of agroforestry corporations 
with fire and peat 
management rules (2014)
Ministry of Forestry 
Regulation P.12/Menhut-
II/2009 on forest fire control 
Presidential Instruction 
16/2011 on the improvement 
of Land and Forest Fire 
Control 
Government of Indonesia Regulation 4/2001 
on environmental damage and pollution 
control in relation to forest and land fires
Government of Indonesia Regulation 
45/2004 on forest protection
Ministry of Agriculture Regulation no. 
26/Permentan/OT.140/2/2007 on the 
guidelines for estate crop licensing
Presidential Instruction 10/2011 establishing 
a moratorium on developing peatlands
Presidential Instruction 6/2013 establishing a 
moratorium on developing peatlands
Ministry of Agriculture Regulation no. 
47/Permentan/OT.140/4/2014 on the 
establishment of fire brigade and the 
guidelines for the prevention and control of 
forest and land fires
Ministry of Environment Regulation 7/2014 
on environmental loss due to pollution and 
environmental damages
Presidential Instruction 11/2015 on the 
improvement of forest and land fire control
Presidential Instruction 8/2015 establishing a 
moratorium on developing peatlands
Ministry of Agriculture Regulation no. 
11/Permentan/OT.140/3/2015 on Indonesian 
Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO) 
Presidential Instruction 1/2016 on Peat 
Restoration Agency
Riau Provincial Regulation 8/2014 on 
Environmental Management and 
Environmental Law Compliance Riau 
Province
Ministry of Agriculture Regulation No. 98 of 
2013
ASEAN Agreement on 
Transboundary Haze 
Pollution (2002)
ASEAN Peatland Forests 
Project: institutional change, 
conserving peatlands, and 
encouraging sustainable 
management (2009)
ASEAN Panel of Experts on 
Fire and Haze Assessment 
and Coordination (2005)
SEApeat project: institutional 
change, fire monitoring, and 
incentives and education for 
sustainable peatland 
management (2011)
Southeast Asia Fire Danger 
Rating System project (1999)
Indofire System under the 
Indonesia-Australia Forest 




ASEAN Agreement on 
Transboundary Haze 
Pollution: Guidelines for the 
Implementation of the 
ASEAN Policy on Zero 
Burning (2003)
ASEAN Agreement on 
Transboundary Haze 
Pollution: Guidelines for the 
Implementation of Controlled 
Burning Practices (2004)
Minister of Agriculture 
No.19/Permentan/OT.140/3/2011 creating 
the Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil 
certification  
Government Regulation No. 57/2016 
Riau Governor Regulation No. 5/2015 
Industry Riau Ecosystem Restoration Project (APRIL 
Group in partnership with Flora and Fauna 
International and Bidara): support and 
incentives for community-based conservation 
on the Kampar Peninsula (2013)
Integrated Forestry and Farming System 
Project (Asia Pulp and Paper in partnership 
with Desa Makmur Peduli Api) (2016): 
support and incentives for community-based 
forest conservation
APRIL Group Fire Free Village program: fire 
management incentives and education for 
communities (2014) 
Asian Agri Fire Free Village program: fire 
management incentives and education for 
communities (2016)
Musim Mas Fire Free Village program: fire 
management incentives and education for 
communities (2016)
Minamas/Sime Darby: fire response and 
monitoring and fire management education 
for communities (2015) 
Roundtable on Sustainable 
Palm Oil (RSPO): principles 
and criteria (2013) 
Asosiasi Amanah: oil palm 
smallholders collective 
providing support for RSPO 
and ISPO certification (2011)
Forest Stewardship Council 
(FSC): deforestation 
monitoring (2014) 
Indonesian Palm Oil Pledge 
(IPOP): evaluation and audit 
licensing of peat (2015)
Giam Siak Kecil Bukit Batu 
Biosphere Reserve (Sinar 
Mas in partnership with civil 
society and government) 
(2009)
Roundtable on Sustainable 
Palm Oil (RSPO): principles 
and criteria (2007)
Roundtable on Sustainable 
Palm Oil (RSPO) (2005)
Civil society Wetlands International: peatland mapping in 
consultation with Deltares (2015) 
Greenpeace: research and investigation 
(2013)
Indonesian Women's Union (Seruni): gender-
based community empowerment (2015)
World Resources Institute: 
research and investigation 
(2014)
Eyes on the Forest: hotspot 
monitoring and investigation 
(2015)
Riau Forest Rescue Network (Jikalahari): 
hotspot monitoring and watchdog activities 
(2016)
Mitra Insani Foundation: canal blocking 
(2012)
Perkumpulan Elang in 
partnership with the Riau 
Natural Resources 
Conservation Centre: canal 
blocking and peat re-wetting 
(2016)
People's Movement to Stop 
Haze Singapore (PM.Haze): 
peatland restoration (2014)
